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Abstract
An extension, QLP, of the propositional logic of explicit proofs, LP, is created, allowing
quantification over proofs. The resulting logic is given an axiomatization, a Kripke-style semantics, and soundness and completeness are shown. It is shown that S4 embeds into the logic,
when we translate the necessity operator using a quantifier: there exists an explicit proof. And
it is shown that the propositional part of QLP is exactly LP. No connection with arithmetic
provability is made.
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Introduction

There is a long history of using modal logic to investigate provability in arithmetic—the subject
originated with Gödel. His published ideas about making  correspond to provablity in Peano
arithmetic eventually led to the modal logic GL, [3, 4]. This is a remarkable logic with beautiful
features. But Gödel also made a lesser-known proposal for the development of a logic of explicit
proofs, as part of a general program to provide a foundation for arithmetic. This was carried through
successfully by Artemov, [1, 2]. The resulting logic is called LP, for ‘logic of proofs.’ Instead of a
single modal operator, it has infinitely many proof polynomials, with natural operations on them.
There is an arithmetic completeness theorem for LP. There is also a natural relationship with the
modal logic S4. One can think of LP as providing a fine-grain analysis of S4 validities.
There is also a long history of modal logics of knowledge, going back to [7]. These have had
much success, but also some problems, most notably that of logical omniscience. One plausible
way of minimizing these problems is to move from known to known for a reason. Then one might
know the consequences of what one knows, but for more complex reasons, and this complexity of
reasons provides machinery that might be used to circumscribe an agent’s actual knowledge. Of
course, mathematical proofs serve as explicit reasons for some of the things we know, and so LP
might serve as a prototype logic of explicit reasons, where the goal is to introduce reasons that are
more general things than formal proofs. This idea was explored in [5].
Besides the arithmetic semantics for LP, other approaches have also been created. There is
a Kripke-style semantics in [6], which makes use of ideas from a simpler semantics in [8]. The
situation is reminiscent of GL, which also has both an arithmetic interpretation and a Kripke-style
semantics. One feature of the Kripke-style semantics for LP is that it makes connections with an
S4 logic of knowledge seem tantalizingly close.
1
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One important result about LP, briefly mentioned above, is the realization theorem, which
connects the logic with S4. It says that, if one takes a theorem of S4, there is some way of
replacing all occurrences of the  operator with proof polynomials that will result in a theorem
of LP (and conversely, though this is the easy direction). The original proof of this is in [2], and
is proof-theoretic, making use of a cut-elimination result for a sequent calculus version of LP.
Alternatively, there is a semantic proof in [6]. Indeed, semantical (non-constructive) proofs of cut
elimination can also be given, [9, 6]. A full statement of the realization theorem is more nuanced,
involving positive and negative occurrences of , and other things, but we need not go into details
here.
In effect, the realization theorem involves quantification ‘from the outside;’ one thinks of the
 operator as a kind of quantifier, there is a proof of. It is reasonable to try and bring this
quantification inside. And there has been work on adding quantifiers to LP, where quantification
is over proofs (proof polynomials). In [10] such a project is carried out, and connections with
arithmetic are investigated. Unfortunately, it is shown that this results in a non-axiomatizable
logic. But one can come at the problem from another direction. Suppose we simply begin with
axiomatically formulated LP, add the usual axiomatic machinery for quantification, and perhaps a
little more as it seems appropriate. Then perhaps we can find a natural Kripke-style semantics to
correspond to this, even if the connection with arithmetic is broken. We can think of what we are
doing as part of the project to investigate the logic of explicit reasons, which presumably is broader
than that of explicit proofs. Carrying out the approach just outlined constitutes the present paper.
The axiomatization we give is rather obvious except for one item, a uniform Barcan formula,
whose exact provence is still unclear. In the corresponding Kripke semantics, quantification is over
domains of things we call “reasons,” and the proof polynomials of LP denote reasons in the same
sense that terms of first-order classical logic denote objects in classical domains of quantification.
We call the resulting logic QLP. As noted, soundness and completeness results are shown. Finally,
using the semantic machinery, it is shown that S4 embeds in QLP in the expected way, translating
 by an explicit existential quantifier, “there exists a proof of.” It is also shown that QLP is a
conservative extension of LP—the propositional part of QLP is exactly LP.

2

Syntax

Following [2], the collection of formulas of LP is built up from an infinite list of propositional letters
and ⊥, using ⊃, and the following additional formation rule. If X is a formula and t is a proof
polynomial, then t:X is a formula; it should be read “t is a proof of X,” or “t is a reason for X.” To
be neutral here, it will often be said that t verifies X. The collection of proof polynomials of LP
is built up from an infinite list of proof variables (typically x, y, x1 , x2 , . . . ) and proof constants
(typically c, d, c1 , c2 , . . . ), using the following formation rules. If t and u are proof polynomials,
so are t · u, t + u, and !t. Proof constants are meant to be justifications for obvious facts, such as
logical axioms. Proof variables are, well, variables. As for the operation symbols, the intuition is
as follows. t · u is meant to be the result of joining together the two reasons; typically if t justifies
X ⊃ Y and u justifies X then t · u justifies Y . t + u is a kind of union; it justifies what either t or
u justifies. And ! is a verification operator; !t verifies the correctness of an application of t. The
axioms in the next section reflect this directly. The language of LP will be referred to as LLP . It
should be noted that in the formulation of [2] propositional variables are also allowed—they have
been omitted here.
The formation rules for QLP extend those of LP, as follows. First, quantification is added:
if ϕ(x) is a formula and x is a proof variable, then (∀x)ϕ(x) is a formula. The usual definitions
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covering free and bound occurrences are assumed. We will use the common convention of writing
ϕ(x) to indicate a formula with some (possibly no) free occurrences of the variable x, and ϕ(t) to
be the result of replacing all free occurrences of x with occurrences of t. The second QLP addition
is that an additional operation on proof polynomials is allowed: if t is a proof polynomial and x is
a proof variable, then (t ∀ x) is a proof variable. The occurrence of x in (t ∀ x) is considered bound.
The intention is that (t ∀ x) should serve as a justification of (∀x)ϕ(x) if t serves as a (uniform)
justification of each instance of ϕ(x).
The language of QLP thus defined will be referred to as LQLP . Other propositional connectives,
and the existential quantifier, are defined symbols as usual.
As noted, constant symbols are intended to be justifications of the ‘obvious.’ As such, their
attachment to formulas is fairly arbitrary, and is handled by the following machinery. A constant
specification is a mapping C from proof constants to sets of formulas (possibly empty). A formula
X has a proof constant with respect to C if X ∈ C(c) for some proof constant c. A proof constant c
is for a formula X if X ∈ C(c). While constant specifications for LP can be quite general, for QLP
we will need to make the following assumption when showing completeness, essentially saying that
a constant specification is immune to the renaming of free variables. Some further comments on
this condition will be made at the end of Section 3.
Definition 2.1 (Free Variable Condition) Constant specification C meets the free variable condition provided, whenever ϕ(x1 , . . . , xn ) ∈ C(c) and y1 , . . . , yn are variables that do not occur in
ϕ(x1 , . . . , xn ), then ϕ(y1 , . . . , yn ) ∈ C(c)

3

An Axiom System

The following are LP axiom schemas, taken from [2]. They are also axiom schemas of QLP.
1. A finite set of classical axiom schemas, sufficient for tautologies.
2. t:(X ⊃ Y ) ⊃ (s:X ⊃ (t·s):Y )
3. t:X ⊃ X
4. t:X ⊃ !t:(t:X)
5. s:X ⊃ (s+t):X and t:X ⊃ (s+t):X
We add to these two standard universal quantification axioms.
6. (∀x)ϕ(x) ⊃ ϕ(t), for any proof polynomial t that is free for x in ϕ(x).
7. (∀x)(ψ ⊃ ϕ(x)) ⊃ (ψ ⊃ (∀x)ϕ(x)), where x does not occur free in ψ.
And finally, we add what we call the uniform Barcan formula.
8. (∀x)t:ϕ(x) ⊃ (t ∀ x):(∀x)ϕ(x), where x does not occur free in t.
There are three rules of inference. The first two come from LP. For starters, we have modus
ponens.
X, X ⊃ Y
Y
Following the terminology of [6], We’ll say a constant specification C is axiomatically appropriate
if C provides proof constants for exactly the axioms listed above. This amounts to a requirement
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that constants serve to justify the obvious, in this case elementary logical truths. The next rule
depends on the choice of C, which is assumed to be axiomatically appropriate. Call it the C
necessitation rule: if X is an axiom and X ∈ C(c), we may conclude the following.
c:X
Finally there is the standard universal generalization rule.
ϕ(x)
(∀x)ϕ(x)
We’ll refer to the system axiomatized above as QLP with constant specification C, where C is
the constant specification used in the necessitation rule. As usual, Z is a theorem if it is the last
line of a proof.
A note about the axioms chosen. We have deliberately kept them the same as in LP as far as
possible. Instead of Axiom 1, a quantified version could have been used:
(∀y)(∀x)[y:(X ⊃ Y ) ⊃ (x:X ⊃ (y·x):Y )]
Of course the Axiom 1 instances follow from this using Axiom 6. Or, using the form of the axiom
we did, one instance is
y:(X ⊃ Y ) ⊃ (x:X ⊃ (y·x):Y )
from which the quantified version follows using the universal generalization rule.
In [2] an internalization result (Lifting Lemma) is shown for LP. That carries over rather easily
to QLP, and plays an important role later on. Here is the version that we need, though something
a bit more general could be shown.
Proposition 3.1 If X is a theorem of QLP, using axiomatically appropriate constant specification
C, then for some proof polynomial p, with no free variables, the formula p:X is also a theorem.
Proof The argument is by induction on proof length. All the LP cases from [2] carry over directly,
so the only item we need to consider in detail here is the rule of universal generalization.
Suppose we have used the universal generalization rule to conclude (∀x)ϕ(x) from ϕ(x), and
the result is known for ϕ(x), that is, there is a proof polynomial p with no free variables such that
p:ϕ(x) is provable. Now proceed as follows. From p:ϕ(x), conclude (∀x)(p:ϕ(x)), using the universal
generalization rule. Then by the uniform Barcan formula, axiom 8, and modus ponens, conclude
(p ∀ x):(∀x)ϕ(x). Note that since x is considered bound in (p ∀ x), we again have a proof polynomial
with no free variables.
Finally, a remark concerning the free variable condition on constant specifications, Definition 2.1. Suppose ϕ(x1 , . . . , xn ) is one of our axioms and C is an axiomatically appropriate constant
specification, say ϕ(x1 , . . . , xn ) ∈ C(c). Then we can reason formally as follows.
1. c:ϕ(x1 , . . . , xn ), by the C necessitation rule
2. (∀x1 ) . . . (∀xn )c:ϕ(x1 , . . . , xn ), using the universal generalization rule n times
3. c:ϕ(y1 , . . . , yn ), making use of axiom 6 and modus ponens n times.
Given this, we see that the free variable condition on constant specifications is, in a sense, a
recognition that such a derivation can be made, and an incorporation of it directly into the constant
specification itself.
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Semantics

The semantics for QLP is, in a sense, a quantified version of the LP semantics of [6], and that
paper and [5] should be consulted for background and motivation. Actually, there are two versions
of the semantics for LP, weak and strong. This same split carries over to QLP as well. The most
notable addition to the LP semantics is that each state of the model has a domain of objects called
reasons associated with it. The remainder of this section is given over to the definition of the
semantics.
A frame is a structure hG, Ri where R is a binary relation on the non-empty set G. Members of
G are referred to as states or worlds, as usual. It will be assumed that R is reflexive and transitive,
that is, the frame is one for S4.
A domain function on a frame hG, Ri is a mapping D from members of G to non-empty sets,
whose members are called reasons. Think of these however you want—some structure will be placed
on the family of reasons below. It will be assumed that domain functions are monotonic, that is,
for Γ, ∆ ∈ G, ΓR∆ implies D(Γ) ⊆ D(∆). Given a frame hG, Ri and a domain function D on it,
D is the frame domain, and is defined to be ∪Γ∈G D(Γ). If D(Γ) is the same for every Γ ∈ G, the
domain function is constant domain. In this case, of course, the domain at each state is the same
as the domain of the frame.
Given a frame hG, Ri and a domain function D, an interpretation I is a mapping meeting the
following conditions. I assigns to each proof constant c a member cI of D. I assigns to the oneplace function symbol ! a mapping !I : D → D. I assigns to the two-place function symbol · a
binary operation ·I : D × D → D, and to + a binary operation +I : D × D → D. And finally, I
assigns to ∀ a mapping ∀I : D × V → D, where V is the set of variables of LQLP . It will be assumed
that, for each Γ ∈ G, D(Γ) contains cI for every proof constant c, and is closed under sI for every
function and operation symbol s.
Suppose we have a structure hG, R, D, Ii where hG, Ri is a frame, D is a domain function, and
I is an interpretation. A valuation v is a mapping from proof variables to members of D. It is
not required that v(x) be in D(Γ) for every Γ ∈ G. As usual, a valuation w is an x-variant of a
valuation v if v and w agree on all variables except possibly for x. Given a valuation v, with respect
to hG, R, D, Ii every proof polynomial t is mapped to a member tv of D by the following rules.
1. xv = v(x) for x a variable
2. cv = cI for c a constant symbol
3. (t · u)v = (tv ·I uv )
4. (t + u)v = (tv +I uv )
5. (!t)v =!I (tv )
6. (t ∀ x)v = (tv ∀I x)
An evidence function E is a mapping that assigns to each Γ ∈ G, to each r ∈ D(Γ), and to each
valuation v a set E(Γ, r, v) of formulas of LQLP . Note that the range of E is syntactic: it consists
of sets of formulas. Think of the members of E(Γ, r, v) as the formulas that r provides possible
justification for, in state Γ, under circumstances v. It is not assumed that being possibly justified
is the same thing as being true, or being known, though it is understood that X cannot be known
for reason r unless, at least, r is something that can serve as evidence for X. There is further
discussion to be found in [6, 5]
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There are special conditions that are imposed on evidence functions, as follows. For all formulas
X and Y , for all Γ, ∆ ∈ G, for all reasons r and s in D(Γ), and for all valuations v:
1. ΓR∆ implies E(Γ, r, v) ⊆ E(∆, r, v) (evidence is also monotonic).
2. (X ⊃ Y ) ∈ E(Γ, r, v) and X ∈ E(Γ, s, v) implies Y ∈ E(Γ, (r ·I s), v) (application).
3. If X ∈ E(Γ, r, v) and t is a proof polynomial such that tv = r, then t:X ∈ E(Γ, (!I r), v) (proof
checker).
4. E(Γ, r, v) ∪ E(Γ, s, v) ⊆ E(Γ, (r +I s), v) (choice).
5. If X ∈ E(Γ, r, w) for every w that is an x-variant of v, with w(x) ∈ D(Γ), then (∀x)X ∈
E(Γ, (r ∀I x), v).
6. If v and w agree on the free variables of X, then X ∈ E(Γ, r, v) iff X ∈ E(Γ, r, w).
Finally, consider the structure M = hG, R, D, I, E, Vi where: hG, Ri is a frame; D is a domain
function, I is an interpretation, E is an evidence function, and V is a mapping of propositional
letters to sets of states. Truth at worlds of M, with respect to a valuation v, is evaluated in a way
that extends that of [6]. The idea behind clause 5 is that X is known with t as justification at state
Γ if X is known at Γ (true in all accessible worlds), and t serves as possible evidence for X at Γ.
1. M, Γ

v

P ⇐⇒ Γ ∈ V(P ) for P a propositional letter;

2. M, Γ 6

v

⊥;

3. M, Γ

v

X ⊃ Y ⇐⇒ M, Γ 6

4. M, Γ v (∀x)ϕ ⇐⇒ M, Γ
that w(x) ∈ D(Γ).
5. M, Γ

v

v

X or M, Γ

w

ϕ for every valuation w that is an x-variant of v and is such

v

(t:X) ⇐⇒ X ∈ E(Γ, tv , v) and M, ∆

Y;

v

X for every ∆ ∈ G such that ΓR∆.

We say that X is meaningful at state Γ of M with respect to v provided, for every proof polynomial t that occurs in X, tv ∈ D(Γ)—equivalently, for each variable x that has a free occurrence
in X, v(x) ∈ D(Γ). We also say X is true at state Γ with respect to v if M, Γ v X, and otherwise
X is false at Γ. Finally, X is valid in the structure M if, for every valuation v, X is true at all
states Γ of M at which X is meaningful with respect to v.
A quasi-model is a structure meeting all the conditions listed above.
A quasi-model M = hG, R, D, I, E, Vi meets constant specification C provided that, for each
constant c, each valuation v, and each Γ ∈ G we have C(c) ⊆ E(Γ, cI , v).
A quasi-model is a weak QLP model if all instances of axiom 8 are valid in it.
A quasi-model meets the fully explanatory condition provided that, whenever X is meaningful
at state Γ with respect to a valuation v, and M, ∆ v X for every ∆ ∈ G such that ΓR∆, then
X ∈ E(Γ, r, v), for some r ∈ D(Γ). A weak model that meets the fully explanatory condition is a
strong QLP model.
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Soundness

It will be proved that axiomatic QLP is sound with respect to the weak model semantics, and
hence also with respect to the strong model semantics. More specifically, what will be proved is
this.
Theorem 5.1 if X has a QLP proof using the C necessitation rule, where C is axiomatically
appropriate but does not necessarily meet the free variable condition, then X is valid in all weak
QLP models that meet constant specification C.
This theorem is shown by induction on the length of the proof of X. Each axiom is easily seen
to be valid, with the arguments for the LP part being essentially the same as in [6]. This leaves
the three rules of inference. Call a rule sound provided that, whenever the premises are valid in
all weak models meeting constant specification C, so is the conclusion. The soundness of the C
necessitation rule is by the usual argument, and that of the rule of universal generalization is just
as in classical logic. This leaves modus ponens.
Proposition 5.2 Modus ponens is a sound rule.
Proof Let M be a weak QLP model meeting constant specification C. Suppose both X and
X ⊃ Y are valid in M; We’ll show Y is also valid.
Let Γ ∈ G be a state at which Y is meaningful with respect to v, but M, Γ 6 v Y ; we’ll derive
a contradiction. The problem we have is that X may have variables that do not occur in Y , and
so X and X ⊃ Y might not be meaningful at Γ with respect to v. Say x1 , . . . , xn are all the
variables in X that are not in Y . Choose a1 , . . . , an ∈ D(Γ), and let w be the valuation that agrees
with v on all variables, except that w(xi ) = ai , for i = 1, . . . , n. Since x1 , . . . , xn do not occur in
Y , we have M, Γ 6 w Y , and of course Y is meaningful at Γ with respect to w. But also, X and
X ⊃ Y are meaningful at Γ with respect to w, so by our validity assumption, M, Γ w X and
M, Γ w X ⊃ Y , and a contradiction is immediate.

6

Completeness

It will be proved that axiomatic QLP is complete with respect to the strong model semantics, and
hence also with respect to the weak model semantics. Here is a proper statement of the result.
Note that the free variable condition of Definition 2.1 finally comes in.
Theorem 6.1 Let C be a constant specification that is axiomatically appropriate and that meets
the free variable condition. If a formula X of LQLP is valid in all strong QLP models that meet
specification C, then X has an axiomatic proof using C.
The rest of the section is devoted to a proof of this Theorem. Actually the contrapositive will
be shown, as is the usual procedure. Let C be an axiomatically appropriate constant specification
meeting the free variable condition. C is fixed for the rest of the section.
Let p1 , p2 , . . . , be an infinite list of proof constants that are new to LQLP . We call these
parameters. Let L∗ be the extension of LQLP in which parameters are allowed to appear in formulas.
The expanded language, and sublanguages of it, will be used to construct a model, but it is
understood that it is only required to be a model with respect to the original language. For
example, in Section 4 we gave as a condition on models that: “for each Γ ∈ G, D(Γ) contains cI for
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every proof constant c.” In the model we construct, the condition applies only to constants from
the language LQLP , and is not required of parameters.
We will be interested in theorems, and proofs, in the extended language L∗ , but the constant
specification C is only axiomatically appropriate for the original language L. Consequently we
create an axiomatically appropriate constant specification for L∗ , which we do as follows, calling
the result C ∗ . Suppose ϕ(p1 , . . . , pk ) is an instance of one of the axiom schemes for QLP, where
this is a formula of L∗ and p1 , . . . , pk are all the parameters it contains. Let x1 , . . . , xk be proof
variables that do not occur in ϕ, and consider the formula ϕ(x1 , . . . , xk ), which is a formula of the
original language L, and again an instance of an axiom scheme of QLP. Then ϕ(x1 , . . . , xk ) has one
or more proof constants, let c be any one of them. We set ϕ(p1 , . . . , pk ) ∈ C ∗ (c). The process just
described makes use of a choice of proof variables x1 , . . . , xk , but since C meets the free variable
condition, the actual variables chosen do not matter. The constant specification C ∗ extends C,
because if a formula contains no parameters, the process just described will assign the same proof
constants for the formula that C itself provides. Obviously C ∗ is axiomatically appropriate, with
respect to L∗ .
The following can now be proved. We’ll leave the argument to you—it is here that our formulation of C ∗ comes into play.
Lemma 6.2 Suppose ϕ(p) is a formula of L∗ , where p is a parameter (not necessarily the only one
appearing in the formula). And suppose ϕ(p) has a QLP proof, using constant specification C ∗ .
Let x be a proof variable that does not occur in the proof. Replacing occurrences of p throughout
the proof by occurrences of x produces another correct QLP proof with respect to C ∗ , of ϕ(x).
Now we continue with the completeness argument. If P is a set of parameters, by L∗ (P ) is
meant the sublanguage of L∗ with parameters restricted to the set P . Let S be a set of closed
formulas from L∗ (P ). S is inconsistent if there is a finite {X1 , . . . , Xn } ⊆ S such that X1 ⊃ (X2 ⊃
· · · (Xn ⊃ ⊥) · · ·) has a proof in QLP (using the expanded language L∗ (P )). S is consistent if it is
not inconsistent. S is maximally consistent with respect to L∗ (P ) if it is consistent, and no proper
superset of S consisting of closed formulas from L∗ (P ) is consistent. Finally, S is ∃-complete with
respect to L∗ (P ) if, for every formula ¬(∀x)ϕ(x) ∈ S there is some closed proof polynomial t in
L∗ (P ) such that ¬ϕ(t) ∈ S.
Proposition 6.3 Let S be a consistent subset of L∗ (P ) consisting of closed formulas, and suppose
¬(∀x)ϕ(x) ∈ S. Also, let p be a parameter not in S. Then S ∪ {¬ϕ(p)} is consistent.
Proof This is a standard argument, with some minor variations. Suppose, under the hypotheses
of the Proposition, that S ∪ {¬ϕ(p)} is not consistent. Then for some finite subset X1 , . . . , Xn of
S, the set {X1 , . . . , Xn , ¬ϕ(p)} is not consistent, from which it follows that (X1 ∧ . . . ∧ Xn ) ⊃ ϕ(p)
is provable. Let z be a proof variable that does not appear in this proof. By Lemma 6.2 it follows
that (X1 ∧ . . . ∧ Xn ) ⊃ ϕ(z) is also provable. Then using universal generalization and axiom 7,
(X1 ∧ . . . ∧ Xn ) ⊃ (∀z)ϕ(z) is provable, and hence so is (X1 ∧ . . . ∧ Xn ) ⊃ (∀x)ϕ(x). But this is a
contradiction since X1 , . . . , Xn ∈ S, ¬(∀x)ϕ(x) ∈ S, and S is consistent.
Now a standard Henkin construction gives us the following. We omit the details.
Proposition 6.4 Suppose S is a consistent subset of L∗ (P ) consisting of closed formulas, where P
omits infinitely many parameters. Then there is an extension, S 0 of S consisting of closed formulas,
and an extension P 0 of P that also omits infinitely many parameters, such that S 0 is in the language
L∗ (P 0 ) and is both maximally consistent with respect to L∗ (P 0 ), and ∃-complete.
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We will now describe the canonical model. Call a set S of closed formulas of L∗ P -world-like if
S is maximally consistent and ∃-complete with respect to L∗ (P ), where P is a set of parameters
that omits infinitely parameters. And call S simply world-like if it is P -world-like for some P . Let
G be the collection of all world-like sets of formulas.
For Γ ∈ G, let Γ] = {Z | t:Z ∈ Γ for some t}. Now, say Γ, ∆ ∈ G, Γ is P -world-like and ∆ is
Q-world-like. We set ΓR∆ provided P ⊆ Q and Γ] ⊆ ∆. We now have a frame, hG, Ri, and it
must be verified that it is reflexive and transitive. For reflexivity, of course P ⊆ P ; it still must be
shown that Γ] ⊆ Γ. Well, suppose Γ is P -world-like, and Z ∈ Γ] . Then t:Z ∈ Γ, for some t in the
language L∗ (P ). The axiom t:Z ⊃ Z (an instance of axiom scheme 3) is in the language L∗ (P ),
so it must be in Γ. Since maximal consistent sets are closed under modus ponens, then Z ∈ Γ.
Thus we have reflexivity. Showing transitivity comes down to showing that Γ] ⊆ Γ]] , and this is
established similarly, using axiom schema 4.
We have a reflexive, transitive frame hG, Ri. We next need a domain function D, and this is
simple. Suppose Γ ∈ G is P -world-like; we define D(Γ) to be the set of all closed proof polynomials
in the language L∗ (P ). (Remember, the occurrence of x in (t ∀ x) is considered to be bound, and thus
if t is closed, so is (t ∀ x).) It is immediate that we have monotonicity: ΓR∆ implies D(Γ) ⊆ D(∆).
Note that the frame domain is the set of all closed proof polynomials in the language L∗ .
Next we need an interpretation function I, and this too is simple. For a constant c of LQLP ,
define cI to be c. For the function symbol +, define +I to be the function that maps the closed
proof polynomials t and u to the closed proof polynomial (t + u). And similarly for the other
function symbols.
The model we are constructing is a kind of Herbrand model, and so there is a close connection
between valuations and substitutions. We introduce some formal machinery to let us make use of
this connection. A substitution is a mapping from proof variables to proof polynomials (the domain
is not required to be finite). The set of proof variables is the same for LQLP and for L∗ , but the
set of proof polynomials is different—we’ll allow proof polynomials from L∗ . The symbol σ, with
or without subscripts, will be used for substitutions. The result of applying the substitution σ to
the QLP formula Z will be denoted by Zσ. Similarly tσ is the result of applying σ to the proof
polynomial t. It is, of course, assumed that substitutions only replace free occurrences of variables.
As usual, a valuation in the structure hG, R, D, Ii is a mapping from proof variables to members of
D, but now these are closed proof polynomials of L∗ . Then we can naturally associate a substitution
with each valuation in the obvious way: for a valuation v, denote the corresponding substitution by
σv , where σv is the substitution that replaces a variable x by the closed term v(x). The following
can now be proved by induction on complexity: for each proof polynomial in the language L∗ and
for each valuation v, with respect to the structure hG, R, D, Ii, tv is the closed term tσv .
Now we can define an evidence function E. For Γ ∈ G, for r ∈ D(Γ), and for a valuation v,
define E(Γ, r, v) to be the set of all formulas X of LQLP such that r:(Xσv ) ∈ Γ.
There are six conditions required for an evidence function. For condition 1, monotonicity,
suppose ΓR∆, and also suppose X ∈ E(Γ, r, v), which means r:(Xσv ) ∈ Γ. Since members of G
contain all axioms (in the appropriate language), r:(Xσv ) ⊃ !r:r:(Xσv ) is in Γ, and since members
of G are closed under modus ponens because of maximally consistency, !r : r : (Xσv ) ∈ Γ. Then
r :(Xσv ) ∈ Γ] ⊆ ∆, so X ∈ E(∆, r, v). Conditions 2, 3, 4 on evidence functions are established
similarly.
For evidence function condition 5, suppose X ∈ E(Γ, t, w) for every valuation w that is an
x-variant of v with w(x) ∈ D(Γ). This means the formula t:(Xσw ) is in Γ for every x-variant w
of v with w(x) ∈ D(Γ). If we had (¬(∀x)t:X)σv ∈ Γ, by the ∃-completeness of Γ we would have
(¬(t:X))σw ∈ Γ for some w that was an x-variant of v, with w(x) ∈ D(Γ). Since t is a closed
proof polynomial, this is equivalent to ¬(t:(Xσw )) ∈ Γ, and this would contradict the consistency
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of Γ. Then (¬(∀x)t:X)σv ∈
/ Γ, so by maximality ((∀x)t:X)σv ∈ Γ. Suppose we temporarily let
0
σv be like σv except that it does not have x in its domain. Then an equivalent formulation of
this is: ((∀x)t:Xσv0 ) ∈ Γ. Now using Axiom 8 we conclude (t ∀ x):((∀x)Xσv0 ) ∈ Γ, or equivalently,
(t ∀ x):((∀x)X)σv ∈ Γ, and hence (∀x)X ∈ E(Γ, (t ∀ x), v).
Evidence function condition 6 is straightforward, and verification is omitted.
Finally we define a mapping V. For a propositional letter P , set V(P ) = {Γ ∈ G | P ∈ Γ}.
We have completed the definition of a structure, M = hG, R, D, I, E, Vi which we will call the
canonical model, though at this point we have only shown that M satisfies all the conditions for
being a quasi-model that meets constant specification C.
Lemma 6.5 (Truth Lemma) Let M = hG, R, D, I, E, Vi be the canonical model. For each Γ ∈ G,
for each formula X in the language LQLP , and for each valuation v, if X is meaningful at Γ with
respect to v, then M, Γ v X iff Xσv ∈ Γ.
Proof As usual, the argument is by induction on the complexity of X.
1. The atomic case. Let X be P , a propositional letter. This is meaningful at every member of
G with respect to every valuation, and the conclusion is immediate, by definition of V.
2. The propositional connective case. If X is Y ⊃ Z, and the Lemma is known for Y and Z, it
follows immediately for X using the familiar properties of maximally consistent sets.
3. The quantifier case. This case too follows the route of standard completeness arguments. It
makes use of axiom 6 and the ∃-completeness of members of G.
4. The explicit proof polynomial case. Here the argument is much as it is in [6]. Suppose X is
t:Y , and the Lemma is known for Y . For one direction of the Lemma, assume that (t:Y )σv is
in Γ. that is, (tσv ):(Y σv ). Then, first of all, Y σv ∈ Γ] , hence Y σv ∈ ∆ for every ∆ ∈ G such
that ΓR∆, and so by the induction hypothesis, M, ∆ v Y . And second, Y ∈ E(Γ, tσv , v),
or equivalently, Y ∈ E(Γ, tv , v). From these two it follows that M, Γ v t:Y .
For the other direction, suppose that (t : Y )σv is meaningful at Γ with respect to v but
(t : Y )σv ∈
/ Γ. That is, (tσv ) : (Y σv ) ∈
/ Γ. By definition of E we have Y ∈
/ E(Γ, tσv , v) or
v
equivalently, Y ∈
/ E(Γ, t , v), and it follows that M, Γ 6 v t:Y .

Of course using the Truth Lemma, all instances of axiom 8 are valid in the canonical model,
and hence it is a weak QLP model. It remains to verify that the canonical model meets the fully
explanatory condition, and the proof of this follows the lines of a similar result in [6].
Consider the canonical model M = hG, R, D, I, E, Vi. Suppose X, in the language LQLP ,
is meaningful at Γ ∈ G with respect to valuation v, and for every ∆ ∈ G with ΓR∆ we have
M, ∆ v X. We’ll show X ∈ E(Γ, r, v) for some r ∈ D(Γ). More precisely, suppose X ∈
/ E(Γ, r, v)
for every r ∈ D(Γ); we’ll derive a contradiction. Our supposition amounts to this: for each r ∈ D(Γ),
r:(Xσv ) ∈
/ Γ.
The key item to show is that Γ] ∪{¬Xσv } is consistent. For then we can extend it to a world-like
set ∆; we will have ΓR∆, and by the Truth Lemma, M, ∆ 6 v X, which is not the case. So we now
concentrate on showing this key item.
Suppose Γ] ∪ {¬Xσv } is not consistent. Then for some Y1 , . . . , Yk ∈ Γ] , there is a proof in QLP
of (Y1 ∧ . . . ∧ Yk ∧ ¬Xσv ) ⊃ ⊥, and hence there is also a proof of (Y1 ⊃ (Y2 ⊃ . . . (Yk ⊃ Xσv ) . . .)).
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For each i = 1, . . . , k, since Yi ∈ Γ] , there is some closed proof polynomial si such that si :Yi ∈ Γ
(recall, maximal consistent sets contain only closed formulas). Using Proposition 3.1, there is a
closed proof polynomial p such that in QLP we can prove p:(Y1 ⊃ (Y2 ⊃ . . . (Yk ⊃ Xσv ) . . .)).
Then repeated use of axiom 2 allows us to prove (s1 :Y1 ∧ . . . ∧ sk :Yk ) ⊃ (p · s1 · · · sk ):Xσv . Hence
(p · s1 · · · sk ):Xσv ∈ Γ, but this contradicts the original assumption that r:Xσv ∈
/ Γ for each proof
polynomial r ∈ D(Γ).
We have now shown that the canonical model is a strong model. In the usual way, it is a universal
counter-model. Let X be a formula in the language LQLP that does not have an axiomatic QLP
proof. Since we have both universal generalization and axiom 6, we can assume X is closed. {¬X}
is consistent. It can be extended to a world-like set Γ, which will be a state in the canonical model.
And the Truth Lemma tells us that M, Γ 6 v X, for every valuation v, and so X is invalidated in
a strong QLP model.

7

Relationship With S4

Propositional S4 embeds exactly into QLP, thinking of the necessity operation as represented by
the existence of a proof. Of course we need a proper statement of this.
Let LS4 be the language built up from the same propositional letters as LQLP , using ⊃ and ⊥,
without proof terms or quantifiers, but with the additional formation rule: if X is a formula, so is
X. That is, LS4 is a standard propositional modal language, whose propositional letters are the
same as in LQLP . Now we define an embedding from LS4 into LQLP as follows.
1. If P is a propositional letter, P ∃ = P
2. ⊥∃ = ⊥
3. (X ⊃ Y )∃ = (X ∃ ⊃ Y ∃ )
4. (X)∃ = (∃x)x:(X ∃ )
In the last clause above, the actual choice of variable is not important—we will standardize on x.
Note that for every X of LS4 , X ∃ is a closed formula of LQLP .
Theorem 7.1 For each formula X of LS4 , X is a theorem of S4 if and only if X ∃ is a theorem
of QLP.
The proof of this will occupy the rest of the section. We’ll begin with the following direction.
Lemma 7.2 If X is a theorem of S4, then X ∃ is a theorem of QLP.
There are two ways of showing Lemma 7.2: proof theoretically and semantically. Each is
straightforward, but each has interesting points.
Proof Proceeding proof theoretically first, we show by induction on proof length that theorems
of S4 translate to theorems of QLP. If A is an axiom of S4 (using a standard axiomatization),
it is simple to show that A∃ is a theorem of QLP. Here is one case as an example. The axiom
Y ⊃ Y translates to (∃x)x:X ⊃ (∃x)x:(∃x)x:X, where X is Y ∃ . Here is a sketch of a proof of
this.
1. x:X ⊃ !x:x:X. This is an instance of axiom scheme 4.
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2. x:X ⊃ (∃x)x:X is provable (it is the dual of an instance of axiom 6)
3. p:(x:X ⊃ (∃x)x:X) is provable, for some proof polynomial p, by 2 and Proposition 3.1.
4. p:(x:X ⊃ (∃x)x:X) ⊃ (!x:x:X ⊃ (p·!x):(∃x)x:X), an instance of axiom scheme 1.
5. !x:x:X ⊃ (p·!x):(∃x)x:X, from 3 and 4.
6. !x:x:X ⊃ (∃x)x:(∃x)x:X, from 5.
7. x:X ⊃ (∃x)x:(∃x)x:X from 1 and 6.
8. (∃x)x:X ⊃ (∃x)x:(∃x)x:X, from 7 using the universal generalization rule, and some standard
quantifier manipulation.

With axioms out of the way, we turn to the rules of inference. Applications of modus ponens
translate to applications of modus ponens. Here is the argument to cover the rule of necessitation
case. Suppose, in S4, we conclude Y from Y , and in QLP we have a proof of Y ∃ . We proceed as
follows. Using Proposition 3.1, we have p:Y ∃ , for some closed proof polynomial p. And from this
we easily get (∃x)x:Y ∃ , which is (Y )∃ .
Lemma 7.2 has now been proved in one direction, proof theoretically. It is interesting to also
give a semantic proof of the result.
Proof Suppose X is a formula of LS4 and X ∃ is not a theorem of QLP; we’ll show X is not a
theorem of S4.
If X ∃ is not a theorem of QLP, using the completeness result of Section 6 there is a strong
QLP model M = hG, R, D, I, E, Vi in which X ∃ is not valid. We’ll show how to convert that to an
S4 model in which X is not valid. Very simply: let N = hG, R, Vi be the S4 model with the same
possible worlds as M, the same accessibility relation as M, and with propositional letters true at
the same worlds as in M. That is, N is like M with all the quantificational and proof polynomial
structure forgotten. Now we show, by induction on complexity, that for each formula Y of LS4 ,
and for each possible world of N (or equivalently, of M), that M, Γ v Y ∃ iff N , Γ
Y . The
notation N , Γ Y means that Y is true at world Γ, with truth evaluated in the usual S4 manner.
Note that since Y ∃ is always a closed formula, the choice of valuation v is arbitrary.
Establishing this equivalence is a straightforward induction. The only interesting case is where
Y is of the form Z, and the result has been established for Z. Here is one direction.
1. M, Γ

v

(Z)∃ is our starting point

2. M, Γ

v

(∃x)x:Z ∃ , which is 1 in more detail

3. M, Γ

w

x:Z ∃ , for some x-variant w of v, where w(x) ∈ D(Γ)

4. Z ∃ ∈ E(Γ, xw , w) and M, ∆

w

Z ∃ for every ∆ ∈ G such that ΓR∆

5. N , ∆

Z for every ∆ ∈ G with ΓR∆, by the induction hypothesis

6. N , Γ

Z

The other direction is more interesting.
1. N , Γ

Z
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Z for every ∆ ∈ G with ΓR∆

3. M, ∆ w Z ∃ for every ∆ ∈ G such that ΓR∆, by the induction hypothesis, where w is an
arbitrary valuation
4. Z ∃ ∈ E(Γ, r, w) for some r ∈ D(Γ), from 3, using the fact that M meets the fully explanatory
condition
5. Let v be the x-variant of w such that v(x) = r. Since x is not free in Z ∃ , Z ∃ ∈ E(Γ, r, v), and
M, ∆ v Z ∃ for every ∆ ∈ G such that ΓR∆
6. It follows that M, Γ

v

x:Z ∃ , and hence M, Γ

w

(∃x)x:Z ∃ , that is, M, Γ

w

(Z)∃

Note the use of the fully explanatory condition. The proof that it held in the canonical model
made use of Proposition 3.1, which played an essential role in the proof-theoretic argument for
Lemma 7.2 given above.
One direction of Theorem 7.1 has been proved. Now we turn to the other direction.
Lemma 7.3 If X ∃ is a theorem of QLP then X is a theorem of S4.
Proof This time the only proof given is semantic, and is of the contrapositive. Suppose X is not a
theorem of S4. Then there is an S4 model, N = hG, R, Vi, in which X is not valid; say N , Γ 6 X.
We’ll use N to construct a QLP counter-model for X ∃ . Let M = hG, R, D, I, E, Vi be defined
as follows. G is the same set of possible worlds as in N , and R is the same accessibility relation.
Likewise V assigns the same worlds to propositional letters as in N . Let a be some arbitrary object,
and set D(Γ) = {a} for every Γ ∈ G. Then define an interpretation I in the only possible way. For
each constant c of LQLP we set cI = a. We set !I (a) = a, a +I a = a, and so on. Of course only
one valuation is possible, mapping every variable to a—call it v. For an evidence function, we set
E(Γ, a, v) to be the entire set of formulas of LQLP , for every Γ ∈ G.
We have now fully characterized the structure M. The claim is that it is a strong QLP model.
Most of the conditions are straightforward. For instance, M is fully explanatory because we have
required that E include every formula at every world, and for every reason. The only item that
really needs checking is that each instance of axiom 8 is valid, but this follows from a result below,
Proposition 9.1, since we have a constant domain model.
We now show that for every formula Z of LS4 ,
N,Γ

Z ⇐⇒ M, Γ

v

Z∃

In this, Γ is any world in G, and v is the unique valuation.
The proof is by induction on the complexity of Z. The atomic case is by definition. The cases
for ⊥ and ⊃ are straightforward. Now suppose Z is W , and the result is known for W . And
suppose N , Γ W . Then for each ∆ ∈ G with ΓR∆ we have N , ∆ W , so by the induction
hypothesis, M, ∆ v W ∃ . Since W ∃ ∈ E(Γ, a, v) we have M, Γ v x:W ∃ (recall, v(x) = a). But
then M, Γ v (∃x)x:W ∃ , that is, M, Γ v (W )∃ . The other direction is similar, and is omitted.
Since N is an S4 counter-model to X it follows that M is a strong QLP counter-model to X ∃ ,
and so X ∃ is not a theorem of QLP.
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Relationship With LP

In this section we establish that the logic QLP is a conservative extension of the propositional logic
LP. That it is an extension is trivial—its proof system includes the axioms and the rules of LP.
That it is a conservative extension requires some work.
Proposition 8.1 Let X be a formula in the language LLP —equivalently, X is a quantifier-free
formula of LQLP . If X is not a theorem of LP, then X is not a theorem of QLP.
Proof In [6] a semantics for LP is given. It will be used here—the reader is referred to that paper
for details and terminology.
Suppose X is not a theorem of LP. Then it is invalidated in some weak LP model. Let us
say X is not valid in the weak LP model Q = hG, R, E, Vi. We’ll use this to define a weak QLP
model M = hG, R, D, I, E 0 , Vi. Note that we already have part of the characterization of M. The
underlying frame is the same as in Q. Likewise we are using the same mapping V of propositional
letters to sets of worlds. What remains to specify is D, I, and E 0 .
For each Γ ∈ G, set D(Γ) to be the set of all proof polynomials in the language LQLP (thus
we are creating a constant domain model). Let !I be the function that maps the proof polynomial
t to the proof polynomial !t. Let +I be the operation that maps the proof polynomials s and t
to the proof polynomial (s + t). And so on. And finally we specify the evidence function E 0 . For
each Γ ∈ G and for each valuation v, proceed as follows. If t does not involve the symbol ∀, set
E 0 (Γ, t, v) = E(Γ, t). If t does contain the symbol ∀, set E 0 (Γ, t, v) to be the entire set of formulas of
LQLP .
The structure M = hG, R, D, I, E 0 , Vi meets the conditions for being a quasi-model. We’ll check
a few of the cases.
One condition on the evidence function is: (X ⊃ Y ) ∈ E 0 (Γ, s, v) and X ∈ E 0 (Γ, t, v) implies
Y ∈ E 0 (Γ, s·t, v). If neither s nor t involves the symbol ∀, this condition reduces to (X ⊃ Y ) ∈ E(Γ, s)
and X ∈ E(Γ, t) implies Y ∈ E(Γ, s · t), which holds because it is one of the conditions that
must be met in a weak LP model. If either s or t involves the symbol ∀, so does s · t, and so
(X ⊃ Y ) ∈ E 0 (Γ, s, v) and X ∈ E 0 (Γ, t, v) implies Y ∈ E 0 (Γ, s · t, v) is true since E 0 (Γ, s · t, v) is the
entire set of formulas.
Another condition on the evidence function is: if X ∈ E 0 (Γ, t, w) for every w that is an x-variant
of v, with w(x) ∈ D(Γ), then (∀x)X ∈ E 0 (Γ, (t ∀ x), v). This is trivially true because E 0 (Γ, (t ∀ x), v)
is the set of all formulas.
Further, M is constant domain, so Proposition 9.1 applies—M is a weak QLP model.
Now it is easy to check that for each formula Z in the propositional language of LP, for each
world Γ ∈ G, and using the valuation v such that v(x) = x, we have
M, Γ

v

Z ⇐⇒ Q, Γ

Z

and this is sufficient to establish the QLP invalidity of X.
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Conclusions

The role of axiom 8 is not particularly clear. We have not been able to find a good semantic
counterpart for it, which is why we simply restricted things to quasi-models in which it is valid—a
beneficient form of cheating. We do have the following one-directional result—the converse does
not seem to hold, though we have no proof of this.

Quantified LP

15

Proposition 9.1 Let M = hG, R, D, I, E, Vi be a quasi-model that is constant domain. Then it is
a weak QLP model—all instances of axiom 8 are valid in it.
Proof Suppose M is a constant domain quasi-model, and M, Γ v (∀x)t:ϕ(x), but M, Γ 6 v (t ∀ x):
(∀x)ϕ(x), where x does not occur free in t. By the first, M, Γ w t:ϕ(x) for every x-variant w
of v (we can omit the condition that w(x) ∈ D(Γ) since we have constant domains). It follows
that ϕ(x) ∈ E(Γ, tw , w) for every x-variant w, but since x does not occur free in t, this is the
same as ϕ(x) ∈ E(Γ, tv , w) for every x-variant w. It follows from condition 5 for evidence functions
that (∀x)ϕ(x) ∈ E(Γ, (tv ∀ x), v) or equivalently, since the occurrence of x in (t ∀ x) is bound,
(∀x)ϕ(x) ∈ E(Γ, (t ∀ x)v , v). Then, since M, Γ 6 v (t ∀ x):(∀x)ϕ(x), there must be some ∆ ∈ G with
ΓR∆, such that M, ∆ 6 v (∀x)ϕ(x). But then, M, ∆ 6 w ϕ(x) for some x-variant w of v. However,
it follows from the fact that M, Γ w t:ϕ(x) that M, ∆ w ϕ(x), and this is a contradiction.
A closer look at the completeness proof of Section 6 shows that, if we drop axiom 8, we can
establish completeness with respect to quasi-models. But without axiom 8, internalization is not
available, and the resulting system does not seem to have any real interest.
Axiom 8 itself is called a uniform Barcan formula. Here is the essence of it, stated using
quantifiers but not the function symbol ∀.
(∃y)(∀x)y:ϕ(x) ⊃ (∃y)y:(∀x)ϕ(x)
where y does not occur free in ϕ(x). There is a closer analog to the Barcan formula itself, namely
the following, where again y does not occur free in ϕ(x).
(∀x)(∃y)y:ϕ(x) ⊃ (∃y)y:(∀x)ϕ(x)
The difference between the two versions is a little subtle. In the antecedent of the Barcan formula
version, ϕ(x) is asserted to have a proof for each x, but that proof might be different for different
x. In the antecedent of the uniform version there is a single proof that is asserted to work for ϕ(x)
for every x.
Almost certainly the usual completeness arguments for constant domain first-order modal logic
carry over, providing a completeness result with respect to constant domain models, if the Barcan
formula is taken as an axiom, and not just the uniform version. But this axiom system seems much
too strong, though I’m not yet sure why. On the other hand, we don’t have a natural semantic
condition to correspond to the uniform Barcan formula, which is why the treatment is as it is.
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